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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Defendants Private Ledger Financial Services, Inc., Linsco
Financial Services, Inc., and Linsco/Private Ledger Corporation
(collectively referred to herein as "Private Ledger") present the
following issues for review by this Court:
1.

Did the trial court properly rule that a principal

cannot cloak its agent with apparent authority in one transaction
where the agent has acted so far out of the scope of the
authority granted to him that he has been criminally convicted of
defrauding his principal in that specific transaction?
2.

Did plaintiffs present sufficient admissible evidence

to show that a reasonable investor of like experience as
plaintiffs would and did reasonably believe that Ronald Harry
("Harry") had apparent authority from Private Ledger to sell
interests in the Red River Mountain Limited Partnership

("Red

River") where the undisputed evidence showed:
(a)

Harry signed an independent contractor agreement with

Private Ledger stating he would only sell securities which had
been approved for sale by Private Ledger;
(b)

Private Ledger's written policies prohibited the

practice of "selling away", and Harry executed a separate written
memorandum agreeing to comply with that policy;
(c)

The Red River investment was never approved for sale by

Private Ledger;
(d)

The Red River investment by plaintiffs was not made

through Private Ledger;

PKNS\0063995 WP
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(e)

The Red River investment never appeared on any of

plaintiffs' Private Ledger account statements;
(f)

Private Ledger's name did not appear on any of the Red

River offering or pre-offering materials;
(g)

Private Ledger recei ed no commissions or fees on the

Red River investments;
(h)

Private Ledger had no knowledge that Harry, who had

been plaintiffs' broker with other brokerage firms for over ten
years, had solicited and caused plaintiffs to invest in Red River
and Private Ledger promptly terminated Harry when Private Ledger
learned that information; and
(i)
money

Plaintiffs, after learning that Harry had caused their

(in bank accounts in Kansas) to be invested in a limited

partnership

(Red River) purportedly without their approval, still

made no inquiry or complaint to Private Ledger?

3.

Does this Court's prior decision affirming Harry's

criminal conviction, including his conviction for defrauding
Private Ledger, preclude plaintiffs' claim that Harry was the
ostensible agent of Private Ledger in the Red River transaction?
4.

Are plaintiffs' claims barred by the applicable

statutes of limitations where plaintiffs claim they were injured
by the unauthorized investment in a real estate limited
partnership and plaintiffs admit in depositions that they were
aware more than three years before they filed this action that
Harry had invested their money in a real estate limited
partnership without their authorization?
PKNS\0063995 WP

2

1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case was decided on summary judgment.

The primary

purpose of summary judgment is to save both the court and the
litigants the time, trouble and expense of an unnecessary trial
by allowing the parties to pierce the allegations of the
pleadings to determine whether there are any genuine issues of
material fact or whether the controversy can be settled as a
matter of law.

Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d

776, 779 (Utah 1984); Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266, 1267-68
(Utah 1976) .

The appellate court determines whether the trial

court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial
court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of
material fact.

Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) .

Although no deference is given to the trial court's ruling
on legal issues, an appellate court "may affirm a grant of
summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even
if it is one not relied on below."

Higgins v. Salt Lake County,

855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) (affirming summary judgment on
alternative ground after finding trial court erred in granting on
other ground).

Consequently, this Court may, and should, affirm

summary judgment based on either or both of the grounds raised by
Private Ledger in its motion for summary judgment.
2.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The original Complaint by Frank Brgoch ("Brgoch") and
Seymour Isaacs ("Isaacs") was filed on March 17, 1992 naming
Ronald Allen Harry ("Harry") and Private Ledger, a national

PKNS\0063995 WP
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securities broker-dealer, as defendants.

[R. 2-8]

Plaintiffs'

claims all arise from an investment each made in May 1988 in Red
River, an Arizona real estate limited partnership.

Despite their

claims that the Red River investments were unauthorized and based
on mistake, plaintiffs never sued Red River or either of its
general partners.

Harry was an independent contractor pursuant

to a written Registered Representative Agreement with Private
Ledger.

[R. 565, 523]

On December 31, 1992, plaintiffs filed a First Amended
Complaint alleging seven causes of action.

[R. 288-302]

Private

Ledger was named as a defendant in only the second cause of
action for alleged breach of fiduciary duty, the fourth cause of
action for alleged negligence, and the sixth cause of action for
alleged securities violations under the Utah Uniform Securities
Act.
On March 30, 1994, Private Ledger moved for summary judgment
[R. 405-407] on two grounds: (1) Private Ledger was not liable
for Harry's actions because Harry acted outside the control and
scope of authority granted to him by Private Ledger for the sale
of approved securities; and (2) plaintiffs' claims were barred by
the applicable statute of limitations because they were
admittedly aware in July of 1988, more than three years before
they filed this action, that Harry violated their express
agreement regarding investments.

On May 17, 1994, the trial

court granted Private Ledger's motion on the first ground only,
but denied it as to the second ground.
PKNS\0063995.WP
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[R. 666, 820-822]

On June 17, 1994, plaintiffs filed a motion and memorandum
for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for a new trial [R.
682-701] based on the same grounds raised in this appeal.

The

trial court properly denied that motion on November 21, 1994.
[R. 823-824]

Plaintiffs-appellants now bring this appeal.

As

demonstrated below, the trial court's summary judgment was proper
and must be affirmed, on both grounds raised by Private Ledger.
3,

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Harry acted as stockbroker for Brgoch and Isaacs at various
brokerage firms from 1977 through 1989.

[R. 493-498, 499-504]

Appellants were experienced investors, who began speculating on
the stock market in 1972 and who had at least two other brokers
who they used regularly for speculative investments.

[R. 63 6-

640; Supplemental Appellate Record, Deposition of Kenneth Done,
pp. 6-7]x

For example, Brgoch invested approximately $40,000 in

speculative penny stocks over a ten year period.

[R. 636-640]

This undisputed evidence is in sharp contrast to appellants'
claim in their Brief that they were

,f

not sophisticated or

knowledgeable investors by any definition."
Brief, p. 6.]

[See Appellants'

The undisputed evidence shows otherwise.

x

On September 7, 1995, Private Ledger filed a motion with this
Court to supplement the official appellate record. The exact page
cites in the official record for these supplemental pages will be
provided to the Court once the motion is granted and the official
pagination for the supplemental pages has been determined. When
referring to portions of the Supplemental Appellate Record, this
Brief will use the page number found in the original document.
PKNS\0063995.WP
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Following their respective retirements as airline pilots in
1984, Brgoch and Isaacs contend that they specifically and
continually instructed Harry (years before he had any affiliation
with Private Ledger) that they wanted no more limited partnership
investments, no investments which were subject to continuing
contributions, and no long-term investments inasmuch as they were
both living off their retirement accounts and long-term
investments were of no use to them given their life expectancy.
[R. 493-504]
Harry became a licensed independent contractor registered
representative of Private Ledger in late December of 1987, and
executed his Registered Representative Agreement on January 11,
1988.

[R. 523-530]

Before joining Private Ledger, Harry was

with Prudential Bache Securities in Salt Lake City, Utah, where
plaintiffs were his clients.

In fact, Harry joined Private

Ledger shortly after his former colleague at Prudential Bache,
Cregg Cannon ("Cannon"), became a licensed independent contractor
registered representative of Private Ledger on November 25, 1987.
[R. 564-566, 519]
On or about May 9, 1988, Harry caused $30,600 of Brgoch's
funds and $31,000 of Isaacs' funds to be invested in Red River.
[R. 461-465]

At the time of those investments, Harry had been

plaintiffs' stockbroker for over ten years, but he had been
affiliated with Private Ledger for less than five months.

It is

undisputed, as the trial court noted, that plaintiffs' long-term
relationship was with Harry, not Private Ledger.
PKNS\0063995 WP

6

To facilitate the later making of these Red River
investments, Harry had caused to be transferred by wire transfer
the necessary funds from plaintiffs' respective accounts at
Private Ledger to the First National Bank of Onaga, Kansas.
463-465]

[R.

Both plaintiffs admit that their Private Ledger

statements in May or June of 1988 showed the transfer of funds
from their accounts to the Kansas bank in accounts in their
names.

[R. 600 (H 3 ) , 605 (11 3)]

It is undisputed that, for

purposes of Private Ledger's records, no mention was ever made of
Red River, and the transfer of plaintiffs' funds to bank accounts
in Kansas was entirely proper.

It was after the plaintiffs'

funds were in their individual accounts in the Kansas bank that
the Red River investments were made.

Understandably, Private

Ledger could have no knowledge of, or involvement in, that
investment.
Brgoch and Isaacs contend that Harry did not seek or obtain
their prior approval to make the investments in Red River and
that the investments in Red River were, in fact, contrary to
their prior specific instructions to Harry concerning the types
of investments they wanted to make following their retirements.
[R. 436, 441-446, 449-455, 493-504]

They did not, and could not,

contend that Private Ledger had any knowledge of the Red River
investments prior to or at the time those investments were made.
In or about July, 1988, approximately two months after the
Red River investments were made, Brgoch and Isaacs each received
a statement dated June 30, 1988 from the First National Bank of
PKNS\0063995 WP
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Onaga stating that funds had then been transferred to First
National Bank of Onaga and that these funds had then been used to
purchase units in Red River.

[R. 436, 438, 449-453, 463-465]

The Kansas bank statements expressly informed plaintiffs that
their funds had been invested in a limited partnership.
465]

[R. 463-

Both Brgoch and Isaacs admit receiving and reviewing their

statement from the bank in July 1988.

[R. 436, 438, 449-453,

463-465, 600 (% 4 ) , 605 (H 4)]
Following receipt of the June 30, 1988 statement from First
National Bank of Onaga, Brgoch and Isaacs went to see Harry in
July, 1988 to discuss the meaning of the statement and the
investment in Red River.

[R. 600, 605]

At the time of the July,

1988 meeting with Harry, almost four years before filing this
action, Brgoch and Isaacs knew that Harry had violated their
alleged express instructions by causing their funds to be
invested in a long-term real estate limited partnership such as
Red River and both were extremely upset that Harry had done so.
Brgoch and Isaacs implored Harry to "get them out" of the
investment in Red River.

[R. 436, 438-439, 441-442, 443-446,

449-455]
At the meeting and afterwards, neither Brgoch nor Isaacs
made any effort to investigate the details of their new
investment.

Plaintiffs dealt only with Harry, and made no

attempt to contact anyone at Private Ledger.

[Supplemental

Appellate Record, Brgoch Depo., p. 127:9-12; Supplemental
Appellate Record, Isaacs Depo., p. 113:17-21.]

PKNS\0063995.WP
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Plaintiffs'

failure to make any attempt to contact or complain to anyone at
Private Ledger after learning of Harry's conduct in July 1988
further confirms their awareness that Private Ledger had no
involvement whatsoever with Red River, or Harry's activities
involving Red River.
Brgoch admits that he received a copy of the Red River preoffering summary at the time of the July, 1988 meeting with
Harry, which clearly sets forth the obligation for substantial
annual contributions to the partnership, but claims not have read
it.

[R. 437, 440, 445]

ever read such materials.

Isaacs, apparently, made no attempt to
[R. 456-459]

Approximately eight months later, in a letter dated
March 15, 1989, Red River informed Brgoch and Isaacs that their
obligation to pay the first annual contribution of over $17,000
was then due and payable.

Those annual obligations were

disclosed in the Red River offering materials.

Brgoch and Isaacs

admit that they received these letters "on or about March 20,
1989."

[R. 437, 440, 445, 456-459]

Brgoch and Isaacs did not

file their original Complaint until March 17, 1992.

[R. 2-8]

Private Ledger first learned of Cannon's involvement with
Red River when Private Ledger received a letter from Scott R.
Frost of the State of Utah, Department of Business Regulations,
Securities Division, dated February 3, 1989.

[R. 511, 567]

Thereafter, Private Ledger promptly investigated the matter and
terminated its relationship with Cannon on March 8, 1989.
512-513, 567-568]
PKNS\0063995 WP
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Private Ledger was subsequently informed that
9

Red River was an Arizona limited partnership and that the general
partners were Cannon and Ross N. Farnsworth, Jr.

[R. 567]

Private Ledger did not become aware of Harry's involvement
with Red River until November 7, 1989.

[R. 568]

Thereafter,

Private Ledger promptly terminated its relationship with Harry on
November 15, 1989.

[R. 568]

Red River was never approved for sale by Private Ledger.
[R. 567]

Plaintiffs' investments in Red River were not made

through Private Ledger and the Red River investments never
appeared on any Private Ledger statements.

[R. 567-568]

Private

Ledger received no commissions or fees on the Red River
transactions.

[R. 568]

Private Ledger had no prior knowledge

that Harry had solicited plaintiffs to invest in Red River.

[R.

568]
At the time Harry became a licensed independent contractor
registered representative of Private Ledger, he signed a written
agreement [R. 523, 564-565], which specifically provided that he
would only sell securities which had been approved by Private
Ledger for sale.
so.

[R. 525 (H 3A), 564-565]

[R. 565, 519-522]

Cannon had also done

In addition, Harry signed a separate

memorandum acknowledging Private Ledger's strict prohibition [and
the prohibition by the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD")] against the solicitation and sale of private securities
transactions which were not approved by Private Ledger, referred
to as "selling away."

[R. 566-567, 508-510]

executed a similar document.
PKNS\0063995 WP
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In fact, following their termination by Private Ledger,
Cannon pled guilty and Harry was later convicted following trial
of four counts, including committing criminal fraud on Private
Ledger in connection with his unauthorized solicitation and sale
of investments in Red River.

[R. 569]

Plaintiffs did not

dispute these facts in the trial court, and never took a single
deposition to refute or contest the matters presented to the
trial court.
Approximately one month before the hearing on Private
Ledger's summary judgment motion, Harry's conviction was affirmed
by this Court, State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1994).
Despite Harry having been criminally convicted of defrauding
Private Ledger in this transaction, plaintiffs contend here that
Private Ledger should be liable in this civil action for his
criminal acts.
4.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This action concerns plaintiffs' investment in May 1988, in
the Red River real estate limited partnership.

At the time

plaintiffs made this investment, Harry was a licensed independent
contractor registered representative of Private Ledger.

Harry

had only been a registered representative of Private Ledger since
December of 1987 or January 1988.

Harry had, however, previously

acted as stockbroker for Brgoch and Isaacs at various other
brokerage houses beginning in 1977 and continuing for over a
decade.

It is undisputed that plaintiffs' long time relationship

was solely with Harry, not Private Ledger.
PKNS\0063995.WP
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Plaintiffs contend that Harry invested their funds in Red
River without their knowledge or approval and, in fact, that such
investment was in direct violation of their specific instructions
to Harry not to invest any of their retirement funds in limited
partnerships such as Red River.
It is clear, however, that Harry's investment of plaintiffs'
funds in Red River was a such a highly irregular transaction that
plaintiffs could not reasonably have believed, nor did they
believe, that Harry had the actual or apparent authority from
Private Ledger to sell that investment.

Private Ledger had

transferred money from plaintiffs' accounts to the Kansas bank
accounts in plaintiffs' names.

What plaintiffs then did with

these funds thereafter was beyond Private Ledger's knowledge or
control.

There was absolutely no actual or apparent involvement

of Private Ledger in plaintiffs' Red River investments.
Therefore, Private Ledger, which never did anything to cloak
Harry with authority to conduct the Red River transaction, has no
liability as a matter of law for the allegedly wrongful conduct
of Harry.

Numerous reported cases presented to the trial court,

and one decided subsequent to the granting of summary judgment,
clearly so hold.
It is also clear from plaintiffs' own deposition testimony
and other evidence in this case that plaintiffs were aware in
July 1988, at the latest, that Harry had invested their money
from the Kansas bank accounts without authorization in a real
estate limited partnership -- the exact conduct

PKNS\0063995.WP
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they complain of

in this action.

Therefore, the applicable two-year and three-

year statutes of limitation had expired by the time plaintiffs
filed their original Complaint on March 17, 1992.

Consequently,

plaintiffs' claims are all time-barred, and summary judgment is
also proper on that ground.
5.
A.

ARGUMENT

Private Ledger Is Not Liable For Harrys Actions
Because Plaintiffs Could Not Have Reasonably Believed
That Harry Had Private Ledger's Authority To Sell
Interests In Red River.
(1)

Plaintiffs Were Keenly Aware From The Beginning
That The Transaction Was Highly Irregular And Not
A Private Ledger Transaction.

Plaintiffs argue that the "most relevant case" for this
appeal is Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995).

(See Appellants' Brief, p. 11.)

Horrocks, which did

not involve the sale of securities, nor a brokerage firm
relationship, merely states that "a principal is bound by the
acts of an agent clothed with apparent authority."
15.

892 P.2d at

The stated reason for this is that "[w]here the loss is to

be suffered through the misconduct of an agent, it should be
borne by those who put it in his power to do the wrong."
Horrocks, 892 P.2d at 16 (quoting County of Macon v. Shores, 97
U.S. 272, 279 (1877)).

But plaintiffs fail to explain what it

means for a principal to cloak his agent with apparent authority,
or why this Court found, in contrast to the undisputed facts
here, that the principal in Horrocks had done so.

Other reported

cases involving securities broker-dealers resolve this very issue
adversely to appellants as a matter of law.
PKNS\0063995 WP
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Moreover, it was plaintiffs, not Private Ledger, who put
Harry in the position to invest their funds from a Kansas bank
account in Red River.

Indeed, this Court noted in State v.

Harry. supra, that:
Brgoch and Isaacs, two friends who are
retired airline pilots, had both used Harry
as their broker since the 1970s. Both men
crave Harry discretionary trading authority.
[873 P.2d at 1151 (emphasis added)]
"Apparent authority arises from the principal's
manifestation of such authority to the party with whom the agent
contracts."

Bates v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 42 F.3d 79, 82

(1st Cir. 1994) .

Private Ledger communicated no such

manifestation of authority to plaintiffs with respect to Harry's
authority regarding Red River.

A third person's belief in an

agent's authority to act on behalf of the principal, however,
must be reasonable, meaning, "from the point of view of the third
person, the transaction seems regular on its face and the agent
appears to be acting in the ordinary course of the business
confided to him."

Id. at 82-83, citing

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 261 (1958) (emphasis added).
Bates, which was decided after the trial court granted
summary judgment in this case, affirmed a summary judgment in
favor of the brokerage firm where the broker had misappropriated
the investor's funds.

Like here, the investor in Bates sued

Shearson claiming the brokerage firm was liable for the
employee7 s dishonesty.

In rejecting the investor's argument that

Shearson should be held liable under a theory of apparent

PKNS\0063995.WP
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authority and

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 261, the First Circuit

analyzed facts far more favorable to the investor than those
here, and noted that the broker's activities were directly
contrary to Shearson's clear policies.

Significantly, the Court

in Bates noted that the investor's checks were not made out to
Shearson, just as plaintiffs had no checks or monies payable to
Private Ledger for their Red River investments.

Likewise, no

monies were paid out of plaintiffs' Private Ledger accounts
directly to Red River.

Here it is undisputed that plaintiffs'

funds were transferred from Private Ledger to a Kansas bank in
plaintiffs' names, and the Red River investments were then made
from the Kansas

bank

accounts.2

In Horrocks, by contrast, the transaction with the agent was
regular on its face and the plaintiff's belief in the agent's
apparent authority, therefore, was reasonable.

In that case, the

agent/salesman of a dairy equipment company entered into a
contract with the plaintiff to purchase some equipment from the
principal, using the principal's documentation.
P.2d at 14-15.

Horrocks, 892

The plaintiff gave the agent a down payment,

which the principal cashed, and secured the balance of the
purchase price with a milk assignment.

Id. at 15.

The principal

then delivered some of the equipment to the plaintiff, but the

2

As noted above, plaintiffs made no attempt to sue Red River
or its general partners, or to seek rescission for an investment
allegedly made through mistake or misrepresentation.
Likewise,
plaintiffs did not sue the Kansas bank or contend that the Kansas
bank had acted improperly in transferring funds from their accounts
in that bank to Red River.
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agent stole the rest, after tiricking the plaintiff into signing a
form provided by the principal acknowledging receipt of all the
equipment.

Id.

Based on these facts, this Court in Horrocks

found "[t]he record replete with facts sufficient to clothe [the
agent] with apparent authority."

8 92 P.2d at 16.

In contrast to Horrocks, plaintiffs could present no
admissible evidence to the trial court to show that they could
have reasonably believed that the Red River investment was a
regular securities offering being sold through Private Ledger,
which Harry had authority to make for Private Ledger.

Plaintiffs

executed no Private Ledger forms and made no payments to Private
Ledger regarding Red River.

Appellants' investments in Red River

were not made through Private Ledger and the Red River
investments never appeared on any Private Ledger account
statements.
The undisputed evidence does not indicate that plaintiffs
actually believed, or reasonably could have believed, that it was
a regular transaction with Private Ledger.

Plaintiffs were

acutely aware as soon as they received the statements from the
Bank of Onaga (not a Private Ledger account statement), expressly
informing them that their funds had been invested in a limited
partnership, that Harry had violated their express instructions.
They were extremely upset with Harry and allegedly demanded an
explanation from Harry (not Private Ledger) of why their money
had been transferred out of their accounts, without their
approval, and why it had been invested in a real estate limited
PKNS\0063995 WP
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partnership.

Isaacs did not even believe an investment in Red

River had been made because he did not receive the regular
paperwork from Private Ledger that accompanied a normal
transaction.

[R. 449]

In addition, it is undisputed that Red River was never
approved for sale by Private Ledger, and that Harry violated the
agreement he signed (and NASD regulations) acknowledging the
prohibition against "selling away," i.e., the solicitation and
sale of private securities transactions which were not approved
by Private Ledger.

Finally, Private Ledger received no

commissions or fees on the Red River transactions and Private
Ledger had no prior knowledge that Harry had solicited customers,
including plaintiffs, to invest in Red River.
Because plaintiffs were immediately aware that this
transaction was not "regular on its face," they could not have
reasonably believed, nor did they, that Harry had apparent
authority to engage in the Red River transactions on behalf of
Private Ledger, particularly when Harry's conduct resulted in him
being convicted of criminally defrauding Private Ledger in this
matter.

Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled that

Private Ledger is not liable for Harry's actions with respect to
plaintiffs.
(2)

The Trial Court Properly Ruled That Where An
Agent's Conduct That Is So Highly Irregular That
It Is Criminally Fraudulent, Such Conduct Cannot
Bind The Principal.

The grounds asserted in Private Ledger's Motion for Summary
Judgment relied upon by the trial court in granting the motion do
PKNS\0063995 WP
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not contradict the general principles of agency law discussed
above.

Rather, Private Ledger's argument that it could not be

liable for Harry's actions with respect to Red River was based
upon recent securities cases that expressly reflect the general
agency principle that a person's belief in the apparent authority
of the agent must be reasonable, and must be based on conduct of
the principal.

These cases consistently hold that a securities

broker-dealer has no liability as a matter of law for the actions
of registered representatives that are clearly outside the
broker/dealer's control.
The leading case in this area is Hauser v. Farrell, 14 F.3d
1338 (9th Cir. 1994).

In Hauser, two registered representatives

at Rauscher, Pierce (a broker/dealer), formed a partnership
called New Technologies in Energy ("NTE").

14 F.3d at 1340.

The

two registered representatives solicited some of their Rauscher,
Pierce customers to purchase interests in NTE.

Id.

The two

registered representatives were themselves the general partners
of NTE and no one at Rauscher, Pierce knew that the registered
representatives were selling interests in NTE to their customers.
Id.
The NTE investment did not pass through Rauscher, Pierce,
the NTE transactions were not listed on the customers' Rauscher,
Pierce statements, and the customers never received anything on
Rauscher, Pierce stationery encouraging them to invest.

Id.

Nevertheless, the customers testified that they "presumed" that
Rauscher, Pierce either was "involved" or was aware that the
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registered representatives were promoting NTE to Rauscher, Pierce
customers.

Id.

And the customers frequently did discuss NTE at

the stockbrokers' Rauscher, Pierce offices.

Id.

The trial court

granted Rauscher, Pierce's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that this private securities transaction was outside
Rauscher, Pierce's control.

Id.

The customers based their action against Rauscher, Pierce on
three separate theories: that Rauscher, Pierce was a "controlling
person" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that Rauscher,
Pierce was an "aider and abettor" of alleged Rule 10b-5
violations, and that Rauscher, Pierce was vicariously liable
under the state law doctrine of respondeat superior for the
actions of the registered representatives.

Id.

The Ninth Circuit unanimously rejected these arguments and
affirmed the summary judgment.

With respect to theories of

control person =md aider/abettor liability under federal
securities law, the court found that the investment
and any related transactions fall outside of the scope
of that activity that Rauscher, Pierce, as a broker, is
statutorily required to supervise.

PKNS\0063995.WP
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Id. at 1342.3

In addition, the Hauser court held that the

customers "were not reasonably relying upon the stockbrokers as
registered representatives of Rauscher, Pierce."
(emphasis added).

Id. at 1342-43

The court based these conclusions upon the

following facts:
[T]his litigation does not involve the type of
securities transactions that could only be performed
through [the registered representative's] association
with a broker-dealer. The dispute here centers on an
investment promoted as an interest in a small
enterprise that was unrelated to any of the securities
offered by Rauscher/Pierce through its registered
agents.
[The registered representatives] were not
acting in their capacity as "registered agents" of
Rauscher/Pierce when they approached the plaintiffs
with this supposed investment opportunity. Rather, the
NTE investment scheme proposed by [the registered
representatives] was their own personal project, in
which they held personal interests. On the other hand,
Rauscher/Pierce has never had an interest in the
venture. There has been no evidence offered to suggest
that Rauscher/Pierce even had any meaningful knowledge
of the scheme or that it was the type of transaction
that Rauscher/Pierce dealt with or had an interest in
at all as a brokerage house. In fact, it was not.
Rather, the NTE "deal" was a separate arrangement
entered into by the co-defendants as private
individuals, not as "registered agents" of
Rauscher/Pierce . . . .
There is no evidence that [the
registered representatives] used their "access to the
trading markets" through Rauscher/Pierce to promote the
NTE venture. Nor is there a suggestion that [the
registered representatives] could not have legally
promoted this scheme without being registered with the
SEC or with a broker-dealer.
[Id. at 1341-42.]
3

The court also noted that the customers failed to satisfy
the requirement under then-existing federal securities law that an
aider/abettor act with scienter.
Id. at 1343. The court noted
that the "concept [of aider and abettor liability] cannot be
applied
through a legal
fiction to an entity
[such as
Rauscher/Pierce] which does not know of the wrong or its role if
any in furthering it." Id. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently
eliminated all "aider and abettor" liability under the federal
securities laws in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank,
... U.S. ..., 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994).
PKNS\0063995.WP
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With respect to liability under the state law doctrine of
respondeat superior, the court ruled that:
The theory appears to be that, since the stockbrokers
were Rauscher/Pierce employees, customers would
reasonably rely on Rauscher/Pierce . . . .
Nevertheless, the District Court correctly concluded
the record left room for no genuine issue of fact,
because it established that the customers could not
reasonably have believed that Rauscher/Pierce had
anything to do with the NTE promotion.
fid, at 1343
(emphasis added).]
Thus, the Hauser court harmonized control person liability under
federal securities law with a principal's respondeat superior
liability under agency law; where an agent/stockbroker acts so
far out of the principal/broker-dealer's control that no customer
could reasonably rely on his authority to engage in the
transaction, as a matter of law the principal/broker-dealer
cannot be held liable.

The same rule of law controls here.

As in Hauser, plaintiffs could not have reasonably believed
that the Red River investment was a regular Private Ledger
transaction that Private Ledger had specifically authorized Harry
to make on its behalf.

Nor does the undisputed evidence indicate

that plaintiffs reasonably believed it was a regular Private
Ledger transaction.

Plaintiffs were acutely aware, as soon as

they received the statements from the Bank of Onaga expressly
informing them that their funds in the Kansas bank had been
invested in a limited partnership, that Harry had violated their
express instructions.

The investments in Red River were not made

through Private Ledger and the Red River investments never
appeared on any Private Ledger statements.
PKNS\0063995 WP
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And like the brokers

in Hauser, Harry told investors that he and his father had
invested their own money in Red River.

See State v. Harry,

supra, 873 P.2d at 1151.
In addition, Red River was never approved for sale by
Private Ledger.

Harry violated the agreement he signed

acknowledging the prohibition against the solicitation and sale
of private securities transactions which were not approved by
Private Ledger.4
Appellants argue, with no admissible evidence, that Private
Ledger purportedly "tolerated" the practice of "selling away"
despite official policy prohibiting such conduct.

The undisputed

evidence, however, indicates that Private Ledger promptly
terminated its relationship with both Harry and another
registered representative, Cannon, as soon as it became aware
each had sold the Red River investment.

[R. 567-568]

Moreover,

plaintiffs produced no evidence from Harry to support that
unfounded claim.

4

This Court, in reviewing the record in State v. Harry,
supra, noted:
According to Private Ledger's rules, agents were not
permitted to sell any securities that were not approved
by Private Ledger unless the agent received prior written
permission. An agent's sale of an unapproved security is
referred to as "selling away."
Selling away is
prohibited under the National Association of Securities
Dealers' Rules because it entails sale of a security that
has, in most cases, not been reviewed by the brokerdealer to ensure the offering is legitimate and is
something that the broker-dealer wishes to sponsor for
sale. Selling away also deprives the broker-dealer of
its share of commissions on a securities sale. [873 P. 2d
at 1152.]
PKNS\0063995 WP
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The only purported "evidence" plaintiffs presented to
support this allegation is the affidavit of Cannon [R. 617-619],
who pleaded guilty to committing criminal securities fraud for
his role in "selling away" activities involving Red River.
Cannon's affidavit consisted of nothing more than hearsay and
unfounded opinions, and Private Ledger filed written evidentiary
objections to that affidavit, including citations to clear Utah
authorities rendering the affidavit inadmissible.

[R. 644-648]

Likewise, the speciousness of the argument that Private
Ledger purportedly "tolerated" Harry's practice of "selling away"
is clearly refuted by this Court's decision in affirming Harry's
conviction of defrauding Private Ledger in connection with the
Red River transactions.

As indicated in Harry's criminal appeal,

he vigorously contested, both at the trial court and on appeal,
his conviction for defrauding Private Ledger.

If, as plaintiffs

would now suggest to this Court, Private Ledger had in any way
"tolerated" or condoned the practice of selling away, that would
have been a complete defense to the criminal charge against Harry
for defrauding Private Ledger by engaging in "selling away"
activities.

Plaintiffs cannot cite a single reference in the

record in the trial court, or in the decision by this Court in
State v. Harry, supra, wherein Harry ever claimed that his
"selling away" activities were in any way tolerated by Private
Ledger.
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Again, this Court's decision in State v. Harry demonstrates
the criminal conduct of Harry in clearly concealing his
activities involving Red River from Private Ledger:
According to trial testimony, Harry concealed the sale
of Red River units from Private Ledger and did not
receive permission to sell the units. Moreover, in a
Private Ledger compliance questionnaire completed by
Harry approximately five months after selling the Red
River units, Harry denied that he had sold any
securities or received a commission on sold away
investments. Also, while employed at Private Ledger,
Harry submitted weekly sales forms to Private Ledger
indicating securities sold each week. Harry never
included the sale of Red River units on any of the
forms.
[873 P.2d at 1152.]
This Court affirmed Harry's conviction of criminally
defrauding Private Ledger, i.e., upheld the jury's verdict that
such criminal conduct had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Plaintiffs, without any admissible evidentiary support
whatsoever, now suggest that this same Court should conclude, in
a civil case with a lesser burden of proof, that Harry's selling
away activities were condoned or "tolerated" by Private Ledger.
Such a ruling would be wholly inconsistent with Harry's
conviction.

Appellants' Brief [p. 10] notes that the trial

court, in granting summary judgment, observed:
The fact that Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of
defrauding Private Ledger crystallizes my opinion in
that one cannot be an agent of the principal at the
same time engaging in conduct which is criminally
fraudulent. They are mutually exclusive actions and
terms.
[R. 847-848]
The trial court was absolutely correct, and acted consistent with
this Court's decision in affirming Harry's conviction.

If Harry

could not produce any evidence to raise even a reasonable doubt
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that he had not defrauded Private Ledger, and certainly
tolerating or condoning his "selling away" activities, would have
given rise to such a defense, plaintiffs could not sustain such a
burden in the civil action.

Moreover, it is undisputed that

plaintiffs did not take a single deposition of any Private Ledger
employee and did nothing to rebut the Boynton Affidavit.
564-569]

[R.

Finally, Private Ledger received no commissions or fees

on the Red River transactions and Private Ledger had no prior
knowledge that Harry had solicited customers, including
plaintiffs, to invest in Red River.

[Id.]5

Plaintiffs argue in their brief that this Court's decision
affirming Harry's criminal conviction is contrary to the summary
judgment in the civil action.
opposite is true.

As demonstrated herein, just the

Appellants argue in their Brief [p.19] that

the statement in this Court's decision in State v. Harry, 873
P.2d at 1157, that Harry's action exposed Private Ledger to
"potential lawsuits from the disgruntled investors" somehow

5

Plaintiffs attempt, unsuccessfully, to distinguish Hauser
by the fact that the stockbrokers in that case told their customers
the investment was not with Rauscher, Pierce.
But plaintiffs
cannot deny that they knew immediately the Red River investment was
irregular and not a regular Private Ledger transaction. In fact,
Isaacs admits that Harry never told them Private Ledger was
involved with Red River:
Q.

Did Ron Harry ever tell you that Private Ledger had
approved of the solicitation and sale of the
investments in Red River Mountain?

A.

No, never said that.

[Supplemental Appellate Record,
added).]
PKNS\0063995.WP
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Isaacs Depo., p. 120

(emphasis

suggests that Private Ledger should have civil liability for such
criminal conduct by Harry.

On the contrary, this Court correctly

pointed out in State v. Harry that one of the elements of damage
or harm to Private Ledger which resulted in Harry's criminal
conviction was the expense of being forced to defend "lawsuits
from the disgruntled investors" such as these plaintiffs.

Even

though Private Ledger has prevailed as a matter of law, Harry's
criminal conduct has exposed Private Ledger to considerable
expense in defending itself, just as this Court predicted in
State v. Harry.
Likewise, plaintiffs argue in their brief [p.19] that "a
brokerage house such as Private Ledger is a principal which
courts have held to a higher standard of accountability."
However, this Court quoted in State v. Harry the written
agreements which Harry signed, Private Ledger's compliance
directives and questionnaires and other policies and procedures
of Private Ledger designed to fulfill any higher standard of
accountability and to prevent the type of conduct engaged in by
Harry.

More significantly, plaintiffs did not present to the

trial court a single piece of admissible evidence from any expert
in the securities industry suggesting that Private Ledger had
failed to comply with the industry standards.

In short, Private

Ledger's evidence on this issue was completely uncontested and
unrebutted.
In addition to Bates, supra, and Hauser [R. 531-534], three
other recent securities cases (each cited and provided to the
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trial court [R. 535-565]) analyze the apparent authority of a
registered representative to sell unauthorized securities and
parallel the circumstances in the present case.

In gohn v.

QPtik. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) fl 97,435 (CD. Cal. 1993) [R. 535541], the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
brokerage firm, holding that the plaintiff had failed to
establish that the registered representative acted either with
actual or apparent authority, where the plaintiff had made
investments as a result of allegedly fraudulently solicitations
by a registered representative.

The court noted that the

investor did not make her payments to the brokerage firm or
receive any receipts or account statements with respect to the
subject investments from the brokerage firm.

That is the

undisputed evidence here.
Similarly, in Jones v. Phoenix Aviation Inc., 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2259 (CD. Cal. February 11, 1993) [R. 542-547], the
investors sued the broker-dealer under a respondeat superior
theory for the alleged fraudulent acts of one of its account
executives.

The court held that the broker-dealer was not liable

even though the account executive had used the broker-dealer's
facilities to coordinate the transactions.

The court in Jones

noted that the broker-dealer's "compliance manual" specifically
prohibited account executives from being involved in business
activities outside of the firm.

[p. 4]

The court also noted

that the transactions in question were not an offering of the
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broker-dealer and that the investors did not receive confirming
documents on the subject investments from the broker-dealer.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the
broker dealer was not liable for the improper activities of the
registered representative because such acts were outside of the
scope of his apparent authority.
McCormack, 630 So. 2d 979 (1994).

FSC Securities Corp. v.
[R. 548-565]

The court noted

that there was no evidence that the broker-dealer knew of the
unauthorized activity, and the evidence showed that the investor
was given a receipt stating that the funds were received on
behalf of another company and not on behalf of the broker-dealer.
As in Hauser, Baker, and the other securities cases,
appellants could not, and did not, reasonably believe that the
Red River investment was a regular Private Ledger transaction in
which Harry had authority from Private Ledger to act on its
behalf.

Consequently, there is no genuine issue of material fact

and, as a matter of law, Private Ledger is not liable for the
conduct of Harry of which plaintiffs complain.
B.

Plaintiffs' Claims Against Private Ledger Are Barred By
The Applicable Statutes Of Limitations Because
Plaintiffs Knew in July of 1988 That Harry Had Invested
Their Funds In A Real Estate Limited Partnership
Contrary To Plaintiffa' Express Instructions,

As noted above, Private Ledger also moved for summary
judgment on the ground that the statutes of limitations barred
plaintiffs' claims.

The trial court denied that portion of the

motion, finding that factual questions exist.

Inasmuch as the

Utah cases cited above specifically authorize the upholding of
PKNS\0063995.WP
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summary judgment on any ground presented to the trial court, the
following discussion demonstrates that summary judgment was
proper on both grounds raised by Private Ledger in its motion.
(1)

Plaintiffs' Second Cause Of Action For Breach Of
Fiduciary Duty And Fourth Cause Of Action For
Negligence Are Time Barred•

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-26 provides that the
following actions must be brought within three years:
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to
real property; . . .
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring
personal property, including actions for specific
recovery thereof; . . .
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or
mistake; except that the cause of action in such case
does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.
(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes
of this state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture
under the laws of this state, except where in special
cases a different limitation is prescribed by the
statutes of this state.
(Emphasis added.)
The applicable statute of limitations for common law fraud
and breach of fiduciary duty is three years.
§ 78-12-26(3)

(1993).

UTAH

CODE A N N .

In addition, plaintiffs' fourth cause of

action for negligence is also subject to the three year statute
of limitations set forth in Section 78-12-26.
Service, Inc., 661 P.2d 951, 951-53

Holm v. B&M

(Utah 1983).

In this action, plaintiffs seek to recover their funds
invested in Red River.

Therefore, it is clear that, regardless

of whether plaintiffs frame their theory of liability as fraud,
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breach of fiduciary duty, or negligence, the three-year statute
of limitations in Section 78-12-26 applies.
Importantly, this three-year statute of limitations begins
to run "from the time the fraud was actually known or could have
been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence."
Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1196 (Utah 1993); see also
Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 247 (1916).

The Supreme Court

further explained in Baldwin that:
The means of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge. A
party who has opportunity of knowing the facts
constituting the alleged fraud cannot be inactive and
afterwards allege a want of knowledge that arose by
reason of his own laches and negligence.
850 P.2d at 1196 (quoting Taylor v. Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 P.2d
222 (1935)) (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court also held in

Baldwin that a plaintiff need:
not have learned every detail of the alleged fraud or
even discovered that actual fraud did in fact
occur . . . .
[I]t is not necessary for a claimant to
know every fact about his fraud claim before the
statute begins to run. [Id. at 1197.]
In this action, the statute of limitations began to run, at
the latest, in July 1988.

As stated above, plaintiffs contend

that, following their retirement in 1984, they specifically and
continually instructed Harry not to invest their retirement funds
in real estate limited partnerships, including those that
required substantial annual contributions, such as Red River.

It

is undisputed that both Brgoch and Isaacs received the statement
from First National Bank of Onaga dated June 30, 1988 [R. 599600, 604-605] which expressly informed them that their funds had
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been invested in a limited partnership.

In the meeting with

Harry in July 1988, plaintiffs became aware that Harry had
invested their funds in a real

estate

limited partnership

allegedly in direct violation of their express instructions to
him.

Thus, plaintiffs were aware of the exact conduct they

complain of in this action -- Harry's unauthorized investment in
a real estate limited partnership - - i n July of 1988 at the
latest.
That plaintiffs were well aware that Harry had done
something suspiciously wrong is indisputably evidenced by their
reaction to receiving the Kansas bank statement:

plaintiffs

testified that they were extremely upset with Harry for having
invested their funds in a limited partnership and implored Harry
at the July 1988 meeting to "get them out" of the investment in
Red River.

In fact, Brgoch testified at his deposition that he

was "panicked" and felt Harry had engaged in wrongful conduct as
soon as he received the statement from First National Bank of
Onaga and met with Harry in July, 1988 concerning the Red River
investment.
R. 441

Brgoch testified at his deposition as follows:

Q. Before you had contact from the Attorney
General's Office [concerning Harry's criminal
investigation], did you feel that Ron Harry
had defrauded you?
A.

What was that again?

Q. Before you were contacted by the Attorney
General's Office, did you feel like Ron Harry
had done anything wrong?
A. Yes. We found -- that all came about -well, it started - - i t started right off the
bat when I got the statement from Onaga Bank
PKNS\0063995.WP
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that he did something he wasn't supposed to
be doing.
Q. But when you first got the statement from
Onaga Bank, you didn't tell him to try to get
out of it, did you?
R. 442

A.

Yeah, I did.

Q. At that time you didn't realize that
further contributions were required, did you?
A. When he said it was a partnership, the
word partnership just got my attention. I
said, no partnerships, Ron. I said, I want
to get out of this thing. He said, well, we
can't. I said, well, why can't you? He
said, well, because we can't get the money.
I said, why not, it is in the bank down there
in Onaga, why can't we just get it? He said,
we can't do that because its not in Onaga. I
said, where is it? He said, its in a
partnership. We just kind of went around and
around and around.
*

R. 443

*

*

Q. But as of June or July of 1988, weren't
you starting to have some doubts as to
whether Mr. Harry was doing what you were
telling him to do or following your
instructions?
A.

Yeah.

But as time went on, yes.

Q.

On page --

A. Actually, I got concerned about my
account.
Q.
R. 444

Starting in June or July of 1988?

A. I don't know when it started.
kind of evolved, you know.

It just

Q. Did it start when you found out that Ron
Harry had bought this partnership in Red
River Mountain?
A.
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Q. Did you actually begin to have doubts
about Mr. Harry before you found out Red
River Mountain was a partnership?
A. I don't remember the time frame of these
doubts. It just kind of gradually grew and
it just kind of evolved. But this is what
really did it, when he went 180 degrees from
the instructions he had from me. Ron Harry
knew that he was not supposed to invest in
any limited partnerships. He never had my
permission, power of attorney, or proxy to
sign my name on anything.
Q. And you found out in June or July of 1988
that Ron Harry violated this instruction and
invested in a partnership, correct?
A.

Yes.

Q. The Red River Mountain Partnership,
correct?
(The witness is nodding his head in the
affirmative.) Yes.
R. 445

Q. On page thirteen of Exhibit E [Red River
Pre-offering Summary], it has a limited
partners contribution schedule. Do you
understand what that is?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What is it?

A. It's the partnership required an annual
contribution to the partnership.
Q. If you would have read this pre-offering
summary in June or July of 1988, when Ron
Harry showed it to you, you would have known
not only Red River Mountain was a
partnership, but that it also called for
annual contributions, correct?
A.

If I would have read it?

Q.

Correct.

A. Yes. I wouldn't have got that far. As
soon as he said the word partnership, that
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would have killed it right there. I would
not have invested in the partnership.
Q. But he did tell you it was a partnership
in June or July of 1988 and you didn't do any
further investigation on your own?
A. Yeah. I told him, I said, I told you no
partnerships. I said, I want you to get us
out of this.
•

R. 446

*

•

Q. Nevertheless, in June or July of 1988,
you knew that Ron Harry had violated a very
serious and express instruction from you not
to invest these funds in a partnership,
correct?
A. Yes. Actually, we're talking about time
frames here and its kind of hard to remember.
He knew right off the bat. I mean, what day
did you say in there that he -- that I knew
he violated?
Q. June and July of 1988, when you received
the statement from First Bank of Onaga -A.

Yes.

Q. -- and had the meeting with Ron Harry.
At that time, in June or July of 1988, you
were aware that Ron Harry violated a very
serious and express instruction from you by
investing in this Red River Mountain
partnership?
A.

Yes . . . .

(Emphasis added.)

Similarly, Isaacs testified at his deposition as follows:
R. 453

Q. Did you tell Ron Harry [at the July 1988
meeting] that you thought this [Red River]
was not the kind of investment that you
wanted to invest in?
A. I mentioned that fact that I thought it
was kind of shaky . . .
•
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*

R. 454

Q. Were you satisfied with Ron Harry's
explanation after you left the [July 1988]
meeting?
A.

Maybe pacified.

Q. Were you mad at Ron Harry because he made
this [Red River] investment?
A.

Yes.

Q. Did you tell him that you had not given
him authority to make the investment in Red
River?
R. 455

A. No, I didn't use that wording. I just
said I was concerned about making a $31/000
investment on a quicky swap or deal, whatever
you want to refer to it as. I was looking
for something a little more substantial in
the way investments went.
Q. In July of 1988/ at the meeting/ did you
tell Ron Harry that you were upset that he
purchased this investment without getting
approval from you beforehand?
A.

I guess I did/ yes.

(Emphasis added.)

As the above deposition testimony clearly establishes,
Brgoch and Isaacs had actual notice in July 1988 of the exact
conduct complained of in this action:

Harry's unauthorized

investment of plaintiffs' funds in a real estate limited
partnership.

Plaintiffs knew Harry had done something wrong by

violating their express instructions not to invest in limited
partnerships and implored him to "get them out."
the statute of limitations began to run.

At that point

That plaintiffs did not

decide to file a claim against Harry at this point did not
prevent the statute of limitations from running: the period
begins to run when the claimant knows of the facts
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constituting

the fraud, and this rule is not "altered by the plaintiff's
ignorance of his legal rights."

Gibson, supra, 48 Utah at 247.

The only aspect of plaintiffs' claims which Harry allegedly
did not reveal to them in July of 1988 was that Red River
required annual contributions.

However, this aspect of the

investment clearly was not as important as the fact that Harry
had caused them to invest in a real estate limited partnership:
Q.

Did it ever cross your mind that there might
be an obligation for further contributions?

A.

Never. I didn't like it because it was
partnership to start out, even before I found
out there were assessments.

[Supplemental Appellate Record, Brgoch Depo., p. 58.] 6
Moreover, as noted above, it is not necessary for a claimant to
know every fact or detail about his fraud claim before the
statute begins to run.

Baldwin, supra, 850 P.2d at 1197.

Rather, all that is required is
knowledge of facts which would have put an ordinarily
prudent man upon inquiry which, if followed up, would
have resulted in a discovery of fraud.
[Id. at 1196
(emphasis added).]
Here, plaintiffs clearly were on inquiry notice after
learning in July 1988 that their money had been invested in a
real estate limited partnership without their authorization; they
admitted they were extremely upset with Harry and demanded an
explanation.

But Harry did not attempt to conceal that he had

6

In addition, since plaintiffs did not pay any annual
contributions, this aspect of the investment does not figure as a
part of their claim for damages. Thus, it was not necessary for
plaintiffs to be aware of this fact for the statute of limitations
to begin running.
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invested their funds in a real estate limited partnership
contrary to their express inscruetions.

Rather, he simply

admitted that it was a real estate limited partnership.
Plaintiffs could have easily learned that the Red River
limited partnership required annual contributions; Brgoch
admitted that Harry showed him the Red River pre-offering
summary, which clearly lists the annual contribution requirement,
but Brgoch did not attempt to read it, or investigate further.
(See Brgoch Depo. testimony quoted, supra.)

Instead, plaintiffs

simply accepted Harry's explanation of the merits of the
investment, even though he did not deny the accusations made
against him.

Moreover, plaintiffs did not attempt to contact

anyone at Private Ledger, even though both clearly felt Harry had
done something very wrong by investing their funds in Red River.
An ordinarily prudent man would not have been so easily
"pacified", in the words of Isaacs, but would have investigated
further.

Consequently, this lack of knowledge about this one

last aspect of the Red River investment cannot prevent the
commencement of the running of the statute of limitations in July
of 1988.
Likewise, plaintiffs did not contend before the trial court,
and could not contend, that there was any delayed discovery of
their alleged claims against Private Ledger.

The only "fact"

upon which plaintiffs base their purported claims against Private
Ledger is that Harry was a registered representative of Private
Ledger in May of 1988 when they made their investment in Red
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River from their Kansas bank accounts.

That fact was known to

plaintiffs in May and July of 1988, and there was no subsequent
discovery of any facts or evidence with respect to Private Ledger
which would excuse the plaintiffs in waiting over three years to
commence an action against Private Ledger.
At the latest, the statute of limitations on plaintiffs'
claims began to run in July 1988 and the three year statute of
limitations expired in July 1991.

Plaintiffs did not file their

Complaint until approximately eight months later on March 17,
1992.

As a result, plaintiffs' claims are time barred.
(2)

Plaintiffs' Sixth Cause Of Action For Securities
Violations Is Time Barred.

In their sixth cause of action, plaintiffs alleged
securities violations under the Utah Uniform Securities Act.

The

statute of limitations for these claims is set forth in Utah Code
Annotated section 61-1-22(7) (a) which provides that:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability
under this section unless brought before the expiration
of four years after the act or transaction constituting
the violation or the expiration of two years after the
discovery by the plaintiff of the facts constituting
the violation, whichever expires first.
(Emphasis
added.)
As set forth above, plaintiffs discovered the conduct they
complain of in this action -- that Harry invested their funds in
a real estate limited partnership in violation of their express
instructions -- in July 1988.

Therefore, the two year statute of

limitations for any violations under the Utah Uniform Securities
Act expired in July 1990.
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Furthermore, plaintiffs learned of the only other aspect of
their claim of which they were allegedly unaware in July of
1988 -- that Red River required annual contributions -- when they
received the letter from Red River dated March 15, 1989 demanding
payment of their annual contribution of over $17,000.

At that

point, plaintiffs were fully aware of every fact constituting
their claims, thus triggering the two-year statute of limitations
for Utah securities claims.
1991,

This period expired in March of

about one year before plaintiffs filed their claims in

March of 1992.

Therefore, all claims under the Utah Uniform

Securities Act are clearly barred by the statute of limitations.
6.

CONCLUSION

The arguments made by plaintiffs on this appeal are directly
contrary to this Court's rulings in State v. Harry, supra.

This

Court concluded that the evidence was clear, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Harry had defrauded Private Ledger by engaging in his
"selling away" activities.

The trial court here correctly

analyzed the decision in State v. Harry and properly concluded
that an agent could not be criminally defrauding the principal at
the same time the agent was purportedly acting on the principal's
behalf.
The rule of law sought by plaintiffs in this appeal is
contrary to all of the reported decisions on this specific issue,
including two separate federal Court of Appeals decisions
rendered in 1994, Hauser, supra, and Bates, supra.

Moreover, the

rule of law suggested by plaintiffs would wreak havoc with
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established business relationships and subject any principal or
employer to civil liability no matter how outrageous or criminal
the conduct engaged in by the alleged agent.

Nothing in this

Court's decision in Horrocks, supra, supports the far-reaching
rule urged by plaintiffs.
For the reasons set forth in this Brief, Private Ledger
respectfully submits that the trial court properly granted
summary judgment and requests that this Court affirm the granting
of summary judgment on both grounds presented to the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
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